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Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new
interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that
different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game.
The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally
attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of
game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our
findings reveal that the ‘‘making of new friends’’ may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation,
but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.
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Introduction
Social dilemmas are situations in which the optimal decision for
an individual is not optimal, or is even harmful, for the society
as a whole. Rational agents, who seek to maximize their own
wellbeing, may thus attempt to free ride and reap undeserved
rewards, i.e. benefit from the ‘‘social’’ contributions of others
without providing their own in exchange. However, many simple
as well as complex organisms, including higher mammals and
humans, exhibit a large tendency towards altruistic behavior.
Resolving a social dilemma entails providing a rationale on how
can behavior that is costly for an individual but beneficial for the
society be maintained by means of natural selection? Achieving a
satisfactory understanding of the evolution of cooperation in
situations constituting a social dilemma is in fact fundamental for
elucidating and properly comprehending several key issues that
humanity is faced with today, including sustainable management
of environmental resources and warranting satisfactory social
benefits for all involved, to name but a few.
Evolutionary game theory has a long and very fruitful history
when it comes to understanding the emergence and sustainability
of cooperative behavior amongst selfish and unrelated individuals
at different levels of organization. Several comprehensive books
[1–7] and reviews [8–12] are available that document the basics as
well as past advances in a cohesive and readily accessible manner.
The prisoner’s dilemma game in particular is frequently employed
for studying the evolution of cooperative behavior among selfish
individuals. In it’s original form, the prisoner’s dilemma game
consists of two players who have to decide simultaneously whether
they wish to cooperate or to defect. The dilemma is given by the
fact that although mutual cooperation yields the highest collective
payoff, which is equally shared among the two players, individual
defectors will do better if the opponent decides to cooperate. Since
selfish players are aware of this fact they both decide to defect,
whereby none of them gets a profit. Thus, instead of equally
sharing the rewarding collective payoff received by mutual
cooperation, they end up empty-handed.
A key observation in recent history related to the resolution of
the prisoner’s dilemma game was that spatial reciprocity can
maintain cooperative behavior without any additional assumptions
or strategic complexity [13] (see also [14]). Other well known
mechanisms promoting cooperation include kin selection [15],
direct and indirect reciprocity [16–20], as well as group
[21,22] and multilevel selection [23,24]. These as well as
related mechanism for the promotion of cooperation have been
comprehensively reviewed in [9]. Another important development
that facilitated the understanding of the evolution of cooperation
came in the form of replacing the initially employed regular
interaction graphs, e.g. the square lattice, with more complex
networks [25–36], whereby in particular the scale-free network has
been identified as an excellent host topology for cooperative
individuals [37,38], warranting the best protection against the
defectors. Since the strong heterogeneity of the degree distribution
of scale-free networks was identified as a key driving force behind
flourishing cooperative states [39–43], some alternative sources of
heterogeneity were also investigated as potential promoters of
cooperation with noticeable success. Examples of such approaches
include the introduction of preferential selection [44], asymmetry
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neous influences [47], social diversity [48] as well as diversity of
reproduction time scales [49]. Evolutionary games on graphs have
recently been comprehensively reviewed in [10], while related
coevolutionary games have been reviewed in [12]. Comprehensive
reviews concerning complex networks, on the other hand, include
[50–53].
Coevolutionary games in particular have also received substan-
tial attention recently, for example when studying the coevolution
of strategy and structure [54], games on networks subject to
random or intentional rewiring procedures [26,55–60], prompt
reactions to adverse ties [61,62], games on growing networks
[63,64], multiadaptive game [65], and indeed many more [66–
77]. Here we aim to elaborate on this subject further by studying
the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game
where players are allowed to form new connections with other
players that are not in their immediate neighborhoods. Concep-
tually the study is similar to [78], where it has been reported that
the making of new connections promotes cooperation and may
help resolve social dilemmas, yet here we focus more precisely on
the impact of preference towards linking together more successful
players (as opposed to just randomly selecting individuals to
connect), as well as on the impact of the number of new links. For
this we adopt the linking procedure proposed in [63], but do not
allow new players to join, i.e. the network does not grow in
size. Initially every player is connected only to its four nearest
neighbors, and subsequently, at fixed time intervals, m new links
are introduced amongst players. Whether more successful players
are more likely to receive a new link is determined by a single
parameter l[½0,1 , whereby l?0 gives all players equal chances
(the introduction of new links is independent of the evolutionary
success of individuals), while l?1 strongly favors the more
successful. All the details of the considered setup are described in
the Methods section, while here we proceed with presenting the
main results.
Results
We start revealing the properties of the introduced model by
examining the impact of the number of newly added links m at
each full iteration on the fraction of cooperators within the
employed prisoner’s dilemma game. Figure 1 shows the results
obtained by a given combination of the temptation to defect b and
the parameter m. Apparently, the density of cooperators depends
strongly on m. While the fraction of cooperators decreases
monotonously from 1 (i.e. a state of full cooperation) to 0 as b
increases, this transition occurs at different values of b depending
on m. It can be observed that the cooperative behavior is
promoted for small and intermediate values of m, but as the
parameter m is increased further and exceeds a threshold value
(approximately m~3), the system undergoes a transition in
which the cooperation-facilitative effect deteriorates. These results
indicate that an optimal value of m warranting the most significant
benefits to cooperators exists. Results presented in Fig. 1 evidence
that there exist an optimal amount of new interactions to be added
at each full iteration step, determined by m via the coevolutionary
process, for which the density of cooperators is enhanced best. It
can be argued that for low values of m (e.g. m~1 in Fig. 1) the
number of newly added links at each iteration is too small to allow
the formation of strong hubs, which however, can emerge (see
below) if the value of m is sufficiently large (e.g. m~3 in Fig. 1), yet
not too large (e.g. m~9 in Fig. 1). It is reasonable to expect that in
the optimal case the degree distribution exhibits a heterogeneous
outlay (see further below), in particular since such interaction
networks are known to promote the evolution of cooperation [37].
Thus, high levels of cooperation are possible even at large b,a s
presented in Fig. 1. However, with m exceeding the optimal value,
the chosen players will establish many more connections, too
many in fact, thereby essentially reducing the heterogeneity of the
resulting interaction network and leaving the whole population in
a state characterized by high connectivity resembling well-mixed
conditions. Note that in well-mixed populations cooperators
cannot survive if bw1, which explains why at large values of m
the evolution of cooperation in our case is less successful than at
intermediate values of m.
The parameter l may also significantly affect the outcome of the
game. In particular, larger values of l make it more likely for
successful players (the ones with high payoffs) to become the
recipients of new links. Results in Fig. 2 depict the average level of
cooperation fc in dependence on the whole relevant span of the
temptation to defect b for different values of l. It can be observed
that at a fixed value of b the presently studied model is increasingly
more successful by promoting the evolution of cooperation as l
increases. This is somewhat surprising as defectors will be the more
successful players at least in the early stages of the game (when
there are still enough cooperators to exploit), and thus one could
further expect that by obtaining additional links they could
outperform cooperators completely. Yet this is not what happens,
and indeed when the probability to attach new links to the
successful players is large (e.g. l~0:99 in Fig. 2), the cooperators
can remain strong in numbers even if the temptation to defect is
high. Based also on previous results [78], it is reasonable to
conclude that high values of l promote the occurrence of a
negative feedback effect that is associated with the defective but
not with the cooperative behavior. Despite of the fact that initially
(in early stages of the game) defectors can successfully extend their
base of partners, ultimately their exploitative nature will convert
all of them to defectors, and hence there will be nobody left to
exploit. Such defector hubs are then quite vulnerable (in terms of
the game they are unsuccessful), and are easily overtaken by
cooperators. Once cooperators occupy such hubs, their mutually
rewarding behavior strengthens their positions quickly, which
ultimately paves the way for a successful evolution of cooperation
Figure 1. Fraction of cooperators in dependence on the
temptation to defect b for different values of m. It can be
observed that intermediate values of m are optimal for the evolution of
cooperation, albeit this depends somewhat on the temptation to defect
b. Presented results are averages over 100 independent realizations
obtained with the system size N~104 and l~0:99. Lines connecting
the symbols are just to guide the eye.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026724.g001
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‘‘making new friends’’.
Since networks are to be seen as evolving entities that may
substantially affect the game dynamics that is taking place on
them, it is also important to inspect the degree distribution of
players in the employed system for different values of the
temptation to defect b as well as the clustering coefficient
associated with the evolved networks. From the results presented
in Fig. 3 it follows that the clustering coefficient of the initial square
lattice (which is 0) increases due to the addition of new links. This
indicates that some realizations (depending on l and b) of the
coevolutionary game give rise to compact clusters of players. By
focusing first on the impact of l, it can be observed that larger
values promote clustering, albeit this depends also on the
temptation to defect b. Especially in strongly defection-prone
environments the larger values of l increase the clustering
coefficient significantly. Since the parameter l controls the weight
(i.e. importance) of the payoffs during the coevolutionary process
(the addition of new links), these results can be understood well. In
particular, for small values of l the selection of players that will
receive new links is virtually independent of the outcome of the
game. In fact, all players are equiprobable recipients of new links,
and hence the clustering coefficient is independent of b. On the
other hand, larger values of l render the selection of the more
successful players to become the recipients of new links more
likely. From the degree distributions (not shown), we found that
larger values of l lead to substantially more heterogeneous
networks than small l. Accordingly, the highly connected nodes
are those successful players who accumulate higher payoffs, in turn
receiving more and more new links if l?1. This scenario holds
virtually irrespective of b, only that for strong temptations to defect
the clusters of cooperative players become larger, and accordingly
larger is also the clustering coefficient presented in Fig. 3. As is
traditionally argued, players located in the interior of such clusters
enjoy the benefits of mutual cooperation and are therefore able to
survive despite the exploitation from defectors. At this point we
can conclude that high values of l enable cooperative players to
grow relatively compact (well clustered) communities starting from
their initial nearest neighbors, which in turn strongly promotes the
evolution of cooperation, as evidenced by the results presented
thus far.
With the aim of further enhancing our understanding of the
presented results, we investigate this model also from the
microscopic point of view, first by showing the fraction of new
links received by cooperators in Fig. 4, and second by comparing
the average payoffs of cooperators and defectors in Fig. 5. From
the results presented in Fig. 4 two regimes can roughly be
distinguished. For small values of b large values of m are optimal
for cooperators to become the recipients of new links. When going
towards larger b, however, there is a crossover, where finally for
large temptations to defect intermediate values of m emerge
clearly as optimal for cooperators to receive at least some of the
‘‘coevolutionary’’ added links. These observations resonate with
the preceding results (see Fig. 1), where indeed intermediate values
of m were found to be optimal for the evolution of cooperation,
especially at large values of b. A relative straightforward view into
the microscopic workings of the coevolutionary process reveals
that this may in fact be because cooperators, despite of their
inherent disadvantage over defectors, are still able to acquire at
least some fraction of the newly introduced links between players if
the value of m is neither too small nor too large.
Results presented in Fig. 5 lend additional support to those
presented in Fig. 4, which is expected since indeed if l?1 the
awarding of new links depends primarily on the payoffs of players.
It can be observed that for small values of b large values of m
ensure that the average payoff of cooperators is the highest if
compared to the average payoff of defectors. When approaching
larger b, however, there is again a crossover clearly inferable,
such that only intermediate values of m warrant cooperators to
outperform defectors in terms of the average payoff. It may come
as a surprise that despite of the fact that at b~1:6 the minority of
players is adopting the cooperative strategy (even under optimal
conditions in terms of m and l) their average payoff is still larger
Figure 2. Fraction of cooperators in dependence on the
temptation to defect b for different values of l. It can be
observed that the higher the l the larger the temptation to defect b at
which cooperators are able to survive when competing against
defectors. The span of b values where cooperators are able to dominate
completely increases as well with increasing l. Presented results are
averages over 100 independent realizations obtained with the system
size N~104 and m~2. Lines connecting the symbols are just to guide
the eye.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026724.g002
Figure 3. Clustering coefficient of the resulting networks in
dependence on l for different values of the temptation to
defect b. It can be observed that larger values of l in general lead to
more clustered networks, and that higher b promote clustering as well.
Presented results are averages over 100 independent realizations
obtained with the system size N~104 and m~3. Lines connecting the
symbols are just to guide the eye.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026724.g003
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distribution of strategies on the network in search for an
explanation, we find that even under such unfavorable conditions
in small isolated regions of the network the cooperators are
surrounded by other cooperators in a very compact manner. Note
that the clustering coefficient in this parameter range is relatively
large, hence supporting the local formation of such cooperative
clusters, in turn warranting a relatively high average payoff for the
small population of cooperators. Nevertheless, the cooperators are
unable to spread but can only maintain their existence within these
clusters that emerge as a sort of a refuge due to the coevolutionary
addition of new links, thereby protecting the cooperators from
otherwise inevitable extinction.
Lastly, we also address briefly the issue of the importance of the
initial state on the evolution of cooperation in the presently studied
model. In Fig. 6 we present the fraction of cooperators in
dependence on b for different values of rc, whereby 0ƒrcƒ1 is
the fraction of cooperators in the whole population at the
beginning of the game. All the results were obtained for
l~0:99, where the addition of new links is driven primarily by
the payoff values that the individual players are able to acquire. It
is interesting to observe that the initial strategy configuration in the
population plays quite an important role. First, it is worth
emphasizing the positive aspect, which is that cooperative
behavior can ultimately be maintained even when rc is small
(e.g. rc~0:2 in Fig. 6). Expectedly, for larger values of rc (e.g.
rc~0:6 in Fig. 6) the evolution of cooperation is more robust,
resulting in complete cooperator dominance over a significantly
wider range of the temptation to defect b. However, with rc
increasing further (e.g. rc~0:8 in Fig. 6), the defectors will
recapture some advantages, and it becomes obvious that larger
values of rc decrease the potentially constructive effect of
coevolution on the promotion of cooperation within the present
setup. Hence, we arrive at the conclusion that in the long run
there is a maximal fraction of cooperators attainable only at an
intermediate value of rc.
Discussion
We have studied the evolution of cooperation in the spatial
prisoner’s dilemma game where players are allowed to establish
new interactions with other players that are not necessarily within
their immediate neighborhoods. While the question of whether
new links amongst players may potentially promote cooperation
has been addressed before [63,64,78], we have here reexamined
this by focusing more precisely on the impact of preference
towards linking together more successful players (as opposed to just
randomly selecting individuals to connect), as well as on the impact
of the number of new links. In order to achieve this, we have
adopted the linking procedure proposed in [63], but did not allow
the network of players to grow in size. We have found that the
resolution of the social dilemma, here modeled by the prisoner’s
dilemma game, is most probable if the selection favors the more
successful players and if the maximally attainable number of new
links added to the population is restricted. More precisely, we have
found that the more the selection favors the more successful
players, the stronger the promotion of cooperation. Conversely,
for the added number of new links it proved optimal if the latter is
limited, although this conclusion depends somewhat also on the
temptation to defect b. While for low values of b a larger number
of new links may be better, for high values of b an intermediate
number of new links is preferred. We have also examined the
dependence of these results on the initial fraction of cooperators in
Figure 4. Fraction of new links that are assigned to cooperators
in dependence on the temptation to defect b for different
values of m. It can be observed that the higher the temptation to
defect b, the lower the fraction of new links that are received by
cooperators. As by results presented in Fig. 1, it can be concluded that
intermediate values of m are optimal for cooperators to expand their
neighborhoods, although as before, here too this depends somewhat
on the temptation to defect b. Altogether, this leads to the conclusion
that who (either cooperators or defectors) obtains the new links is
crucial for the successful evolution of cooperation. Presented results are
averages over 100 independent realizations obtained with the system
size N~104 and l~0:99. Lines connecting the symbols are just to
guide the eye.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026724.g004
Figure 5. Average payoffs of cooperators (open symbols) and
defectors (filled symbols) in dependence on the temptation to
defect b for different values of m. The success of different values of
m to optimally promote the evolution of cooperation is reflected also in
the average payoffs, with intermediate values of m clearly maintaining
cooperators more successful than defectors even at high values of b.T o
a lesser extent this is true for small (e.g. m~1) and large (e.g. m~9)
values of m, although for small values of b higher values of m are
actually the most effective. The optimal value of m thus depends on the
severity of the social dilemma. While low temptations to defect are
offset more effectively by larger values of m, high temptations to defect
are dealt with better by intermediate values of m (note that at b~1:6
the intermediate value m~3 warrants the biggest difference between
the average payoffs of the two strategies). Presented results are
averages over 100 independent realizations obtained with the system
size N~104 and l~0:99. Lines connecting the symbols are just to
guide the eye.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026724.g005
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highly cooperative states are not optimal starting points for the
successful evolution of cooperation. We have argued that this may
be due to the fact that defectors thrive in populations where there
are numerous cooperators to exploit, and ultimately this may
become a disadvantage in the latter stages of the game, although
this observation may require additional research in order to be
better understood. Altogether, our results indicate that new links
amongst players may promote cooperation, although it is
important to take into account many factors for this conclusion
to remain valid. Most importantly, links should be established
preferentially amongst the more successful players and must not be
too many. This leads us to the reiteration of the statement from the
Abstract of this paper, being that the ‘‘making of new friends’’ may
be an important activity for the successful evolution of coopera-
tion, but at the same time, it has to be emphasized that friends
must be selected carefully and their number kept within
reasonable bounds. We hope that this study will motivate further
research on coevolutionary games and promote our understanding
of the evolution of cooperation.
Methods
We consider the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game where each
player occupies a node on the square lattice of size N and is
connected to its four nearest neighbors. Initially each player
is designated either as a cooperator or defector with equal
probability unless stated otherwise, and players obtain their payoffs
by means of pairwise interactions with all their partners. Following
standard practice, the payoffs are T~b for a defector playing with
a cooperator, R~1 for mutual cooperation, and S~P~0 for a
cooperator facing a defector and mutual defection, respectively.
We thus have the payoff matrix
C
D
10
b 0
   CD
with the only free parameter being the temptation to defect b. This
setup preserve the essential dilemma in that no matter what the
opponent does, defection leads to a higher (or at least equal)
payoff. Selfish and rational players would therefore always choose
defection. But since the payoff for mutual defection is smaller than
the payoff for mutual cooperation (RwP) the dilemma arises on
what to choose if having in mind also the welfare of the society and
not just personal interests. As usual, in one full iteration cycle each
agent plays the game once with all its neighbors.
Following payoff accumulation, players attempt to adopt
strategies from their neighbors with the aim of increasing their
fitness (success) in future rounds of the game. Suppose that player
x with kx neighbors (initially this will be four, but may increase
due to coevolution) accumulates its payoff px. To update its
strategy, player x selects one player y amongst its kx neighbors
with equal probability (~1=kx). Following [79], we use the Fermi
strategy adoption function given by
W(sy?sx)~
1
1zexp½(px{py)=K 
, ð1Þ
which constitutes the probability that player x will adopt the
strategy of player y, where K determines the uncertainty by
strategy adoptions or its inverse the intensity of selection. In this
work we set K~0:1, which strongly prefers strategy adoptions
from the more successful players, yet it is not impossible that a
player performing worse will be adopted either. All the players
update their strategies according to this rule in a synchronous
manner.
Importantly, here we extend the above traditional setup by
allowing players to increase their neighborhoods by linking with
players that may be far from their nearest neighbors. Thus,
parallel with the evolution of strategies, interactions between
players evolve as well. In particular, after every full iteration, m
new links are added amongst players while keeping the network
size fixed at N. For every new link two individuals are chosen at
random from the whole population, with the probability Qi(n) of
choosing agent i in game round n defined as (following [63])
Qi(n)~
1{lzlfi(n)
PN
j~1 ½1{lzlfj(n) 
, ð2Þ
where N is the system size and fj(n) is the accumulated payoff of
agent j. The parameter l[½0,1  controls the importance of the
payoffs in the creation of new links amongst players. The case of
l~0 corresponds to neutrality, where each player has equal
chances of obtaining a new link, irrespective of its evolutionary
success. Conversely, positive values of l render the selection of
the more successful players more likely, i.e. players with fj(n)=0
are chosen preferentially, while l~1 implies that the selection
probability is linear with the magnitude of the payoffs (indicating
clearly that the most successful players are most likely to obtain
new links). We emphasize that self-interactions and duplicate
links are omitted. It is also important to note that the continuing
addition of new links without growth, i.e. new players, evidently
leads to a fully connected network. Yet the time scales [80] in this
model concerning the evolution of cooperation and the evolution
of interactions are very different, such that a quasi stationary state
Figure 6. Fraction of cooperators in dependence on the
temptation to defect b for different initial fractions of
cooperators rc. It is interesting to observe that too high initial values
of rc may act detrimental on the evolution of cooperation in the
considered model. This may be attributed to the fact that defectors
thrive in populations where there are numerous cooperators to exploit,
and ultimately this may become a disadvantage in the latter stages of
the game. Presented results indicate that an intermediate initial level of
cooperators is optimal for the evolution of cooperation. Presented
results are averages over 100 independent realizations obtained with
the system size N~104, m~3 and l~0:99. Lines connecting the
symbols are just to guide the eye.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026724.g006
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Since the focus here is on the evolution of cooperation, we stop the
simulations once this quasi stationary state is reached to record the
final results.
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